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EO= R2 20010610 HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H

SUBJECT= AWC BRIEFED ON THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO ASIA

REFERENCE= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

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CONCEPTS= ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, BRIEFINGS, MINISTERIAL VISITS

TAGS= PEPR, EAID, SOPN, XE, AS, ASEAN, (HAIG, ALEXANDER M JR)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR 7723	Date: 12/5/96
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:	
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PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

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AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE  
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 6/10/01 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H.)

TAGS: PEPR, XE, ASEAN

SUBJECT: AWC BRIEFED ON THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO ASIA

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE BRIEFED THE ASEAN WASHINGTON COMMITTEE (AWC) IN DETAIL ON THE SECRETARY'S PLANNED TRIP TO ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. HE DESCRIBED U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE BEIJING PORTION OF THE TRIP AND SAID THE SECRETARY WOULD DISCUSS WITH THE CHINESE ASEAN CONCERNS SUCH AS PRC SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN INSURGENCIES. KAMPUC;EA IS EXPECTED TO BE THE CENTRAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA AT THE ASEAN MINISTERIAL IN MANILA, BUT THE SECRETARY WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS HIS TRIP TO CHINA AND GLOBAL ISSUES GENERALLY. END SUMMARY

3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE BRIEFED THE FIVE AWC AMBASSADORS JUNE 8 ON THE SECRETARY'S PLANNED TRIP TO HONG KONG, BEIJING, MANILA, AND WELLINGTON. HE SAID THE PRINCIPAL GOAL OF THE TRIP IS TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC TO U.S. GLOBAL INTERESTS. AMB. HOLDRIDGE DESCRIBED THE ITINERARY IN DETAIL AND LISTED THE PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS WHO WILL ACCOMPANY THE SECRETARY. HE MENTIONED THAT THE TIMING OF THE VISIT TO BEIJING WAS BASED PURELY ON LOGISTICS. THE SECRETARY

NEEDED TO BE BACK IN WASHINGTON FOR PRIME MINISTER FRAZER'S  
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VISIT JUNE 30 AND TO GO TO BEIJING AFTER WELLINGTON WOULD HAVE COST SEVERAL EXTRA DAYS TRAVEL TIME. AMB. ASHARI RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM FOR ASEAN, AND IN FACT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON HIS BEIJING VISIT IN MANILA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE THEN BRIEFED THE AWC ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THE SECRETARY EXPECTS TO DISCUSS AT EACH STOP.

4. HONG KONG WAS DESCRIBED AS A REST STOP, WITH THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IN BEIJING. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE CHINESE ON THE STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE WORLD AND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH DISCUSSIONS WILL NOT BE LIMITED TO EAST ASIA BUT WILL ALSO COVER OTHER AREAS OF MUTUAL STRATE-

GIC INTEREST SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST, POLAND, SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN. A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME WILL BE DEVOTED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA INCLUDING THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA. THE SECRETARY INTENDS TO CONVEY TO THE CHINESE THE CONCERNS SOME MEMBERS OF ASEAN HAVE WITH REGARD TO THE PRC'S ROLE IN THE REGION, INCLUDING CONCERN OVER CHINESE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF POL POT'S RETURN TO POWER IN KAMPUCHEA.

5. U.S. EXPORTS OF DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED. AMB. HOLDRIDGE EXPLAINED THE RECENT NSC DECISION TO MAKE MORE FLEXIBLE THE RULES ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR SUCH TECHNOLOGY. HE CHARACTERIZED THE DECISION AS A GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF OUR POLICY, NOT A QUANTUM JUMP FORWARD. THE NEW RULES ALLOW THE CHINESE TO GET A SLIGHTLY BETTER DEAL THAN THE SOVIET UNION IN TERMS OF TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS IN RECOGNITION OF THE GROWING COMMONALITY OF STRATEGIC CONCERNS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. WITH REGARD TO THE SALE OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO CHINA, THE U.S. WILL LISTEN TO WHAT THE CHINESE HAVE TO SAY BUT NO DECISIONS WILL BE MADE. THE U.S. WILL RESPOND TO THE CHINESE ON A CASE-BY-

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CASE BASIS, ONLY AFTER CAREFUL CONSULTATION WITH OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND WITH OUR OWN CONGRESS.

6. THE U.S. EXPECTS THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN. THE SECRETARY WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN WILL BE HANDLED IN A WAY FULLY CONSISTENT WITH BOTH THE COMMUNIQUE (ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRC) AND THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. AMB. HOLDRIDGE POINTED OUT THAT THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT STIPULATES THAT THE U.S. WILL SELL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO TAIWAN ON THE BASIS OF OUR JUDGMENT OF TAIWAN'S MILITARY NEEDS. NO DECISIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN MADE WITH REGARD

TO THE SALE OF SPECIFIC WEAPON SYSTEMS AND AMB. HOLDRIDGE DID NOT EXPECT SUCH DECISIONS TO BE FORTHCOMING IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT, AS NOTED, HE STRESSED THAT ANY DECISIONS WOULD BE BASED ON OUR ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN'S SECURITY NEEDS. FINALLY, THERE WILL BE SOME DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE MATTERS WITH THE CHINESE.

7. THE SECRETARY WILL FULLY BRIEF THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON HIS CHINA TRIP. HE WILL ALSO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH ASEAN ON THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE

SAID THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED TO ATTEND THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA IN JULY, PROVIDED THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON HOLDING IT. STRATEGY WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ASEAN VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN KHMER POLITICS (SON SANN, SIHANOUK, UNITED FRONT POSSIBILITIES, ETC.) AND WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN ASSIST, INCLUDING POSSIBLE MATERIAL SUPPORT (WHICH WOULD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE REPRESENT A CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESENT HUMANITARIAN AID), IN IMPLEMENTING ASEAN PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO KAMPUCHEA WILL BE SUBJECTS WE ARE WILLING TO

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DISCUSS.

8. THE SECRETARY WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ON TIN AND LAW OF THE SEA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE CAUTIONED THAT OUR RESPONSE WILL NOT BE DEFINITIVE SINCE THE TIN NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONCURRENTLY GOING ON IN GENEVA AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S LOS POLICY REVIEW IS NOT YET COMPLETE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THAI AMBASSADOR PROK, AMB. HOLDRIDGE SAID WE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS REFUGEE ISSUES AND THAT REFUGEE COORDINATOR JULIA TAFT IS ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY TO MANILA (SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS LEARNED THAT MRS. TAFT WOULD NOT BE ATTENDING AND THAT DAS NEGROPONTE WOULD HANDLE THIS ISSUE). AMB. HOLDRIDGE ASKED THE ASEAN AMBASSADORS TO INFORM HIM OF ANY SUBJECTS THEIR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT RAISE AT MANILA. THE ASEAN AMBASSADORS SAID THEY HAD NOTHING FROM THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRIES ON THIS, BUT WOULD ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT IF ANYTHING WERE RECEIVED.

9. AMB. HOLDRIDGE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE SECRETARY'S PLANS FOR THE ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING IN WELLINGTON. HE SAID FOUR ITEMS WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA: A BRIEFING ON THE SECRETARY'S CHINA TRIP; DISCUSSION OF THE WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION INCLUDING INDOCHINA; SPECIFIC STRATEGIC PLANNING RELATED TO ANZUS; AND BILATERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

10. AMB. ASHARI (INDONESIA) SUGGESTED THAT AID TO VIETNAM

MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT MANILA, IMPLYING THAT AID MIGHT BE USED AS AN INCENTIVE TO CHANGE VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR IN KAMPUCHEA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE SAID THE U.S. CERTAINLY WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANY RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WHILE ITS TROOPS REMAINED IN KAMPUCHEA AND EXPRESSED USG BELIEF THAT OFFER OF AID OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS PRIOR TO CONCESSIONS FROM

VIETNAM WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE ANY CHANGES IN HANOI'S  
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POSITION. DAS NEGROPONTE POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF THE CAMBODIA PROBLEM WERE RESOLVED, PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR AID TO VIETNAM, AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLE RESTORATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS, COULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO MUSTER. AMB. ASHARI ALSO ASKED ABOUT U.S. VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN THE DEFENSE OF ASIA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT SEEK A JAPAN WITH WIDE-RANGING MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGHOUT ASIA. THE U.S. GOAL IS GREATER JAPANESE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF THE SEA AND AIRLINES AROUND JAPAN AND INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF WESTERN STRATEGIC INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS WHERE JAPAN HAS NOT TRADITIONALLY PROVIDED SUCH ASSISTANCE (THE CARIBBEAN, SOUTHWEST ASIA, ETC.).

11. AMB. ZAIN (MALAYSIA) ASKED HOW MUCH DETAIL WE EXPECTED TO GO INTO IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON KAMPUCHEA AT MANILA. AMB. HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT WE EXPECTED SUCH DISCUSSIONS TO BE VERY COMPREHENSIVE. DAS NEGROPONTE POINTED OUT THAT ASEAN WILL HAVE PREPARED ITS OWN JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT MANILA AND THAT IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE A CONVENIENT POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS. THE SECRETARY WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN THE RESULTS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DELIBERATIONS. DAS NEGROPONTE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD ARRIVE IN MANILA ON JUNE 14 SO THAT HE COULD BETTER FOLLOW EVENTS DURING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS.

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